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Great Olympics, New China: Intellectual
Property Enforcement Steps Up to the
Mark
I. INTRODUcTION
Investors with valuable technology, bold enough to enter
China's markets, find themselves in a love-hate relationship with
the land that is "both the problem and the opportunity."' On one
hand, China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
2
promised unsurpassed access to China's markets. On the other
hand, China's reputation for being an intellectual property black
hole is not undeserved.3 Investors waited eagerly as China acceded
to the WTO and the attached Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS Agreement") 4 with the
hope that China would soon become fertile ground for profitable
technology investment. Unfortunately, although accession-
motivated changes in intellectual property law brought China on
par with the global powers in legislation, enforcement trails far
behind.
Two opposing sides of the debate emerged amidst the desire
to enter China's markets. One side of this debate, under pressure
by domestic industry lobbyist groups and repeated throughout the
1. Anthony O'Reilly, The Real Threat to World Trade Comes from China; We Have
to Recognize That China is Both the Problem and the Opportunity of the Future,
INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Sept. 24,2003, at 17.
2. China acceded to the WTO on December 12, 2001. Accession of the People's
Republic of China, Decision of 10 November 2001, No. WT/L/432, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acc-e/completeacc e.htm (Nov. 23, 2001)
[hereinafter Accession of the People's Republic of China].
3. See, e.g., Peter Marsh, Fear of High-Tech Piracy Makes Some Microchip
Companies Cool About China-Potential Investors Can be Wary but Others Detect
Growing Awareness There of the Need for Law, FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2004, available at 2004
WL 85138132.
4. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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United States' China policy, calls for trade sanctions and threats!
The other side, primarily urged by international law scholars,
would rather encourage China to open its markets in ways other
than erecting a wall that disrupts trade flows and perpetuates
protectionism.6 These approaches underlined the debate leading
up to China's accession, and the latter won out briefly7 when China
acceded to the WTO in December 2001. WTO members
rationalized that enforcement would inevitably follow treaty-
forced intellectual property legislation because China needed to
enter and maintain membership in the WTO. When enforcement
did not follow fast enough, however, the United States reverted
back to protectionist rhetoric and thereby undermined the
possibility of forming an effective intellectual property regime.'
Enter the XXIX Olympiad. The 2008 Olympics is uniquely
positioned to change China's intellectual property rights (IPR)
enforcement framework. Not only is China's international
reputation on the world's cultural stage at stake in hosting the
Olympics, but preparation for the XXIX Olympiad will also bring
irreversible technology transfer into China. Chinese citizens will,
for the first time, comprehend what intellectual property
infringement means on a national scale through China's protection
of the Olympic trademarks. Unlike the imposition of wholesale
foreign laws, the Olympics provide the flexibility, guidance, and
training necessary for Chinese citizens to understand how
5. China has been continually criticized for its lack of enforcement and weak
penalties, but the United States leads the pack as China's harshest critic. See, e.g., Press
Release, Bureau of Int'l Info. Programs, U.S. Dep't of State, Grassley Urges China to
Comply with Its Trade Obligations (Oct. 7, 2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives.
6. China's accession to the WTO illustrates this debate. Early opponents to granting
Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to China leveraged human rights violations, but even
on this point, scholars agree that China should not be isolated. See Hearings on China
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) Trade Status: Human Rights Consequence, Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and Human Rights Comm. on Int'l Relations, U.S.H.R.
104th Sess. (1996) (testimony of Prof. James V. Feinerman, Geo. U. L. Ctr.), at
http://www.house.gov/international-relations/104th/hrctes3.htm [hereinafter Hearings]; see
also A Land of Opportunity and Threat, N.Z. HERALD, Sept. 25, 2003, available at 2003
WL 67391789.
7. In the 1990s, the United States reluctantly changed its China policy to one of
cooperation and partnership. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 6.
8. Murray Hiebert & David Murphy, The One-Two Punch: China is Coming Under
Fire in the United States on Two Fronts; Politicians and Others Accuse Beijing of Stealing
U.S. Jobs; but Growing Anger at the Slow Pace of Trade Reforms May Prove the Bigger
Issue, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 2, 2003, available at 2003 WL-FEER 59147233.
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intellectual property protection can benefit not only foreign IPR
holders, but also domestic businesses.
The Olympics will complete what Li Changxu, head of the
China United Intellectual Property Investigation Center, referred
to as the needed "electricity and water pipes" in the larger
metaphor of building a house that is the Chinese intellectual
property regime. 9 Part of this construction is the legal reform
movement to alleviate the Chinese Communist Party's ("the
Party") vast discretionary powers in favor of a due process
oriented rule of law.' ° The non-politics based Olympic movement,
along with internal legal reforms toward a rule of law, will cement
the necessary foundation for intellectual property enforcement.
This comment argues that the 2008 Olympics is in a unique
position to set the framework for legal adherence to the rights of
foreign intellectual property owners. Legal reforms toward a rule
of law can fortify this eight-year preparatory period into
permanence for intellectual property enforcement, but progress
would be hampered by the United States' revived threats of
unilateral protectionist sanctions. Part II briefly describes the
transforming role of Party discretion in the post-Mao era and the
emerging role of the "rule of law" necessary for an intellectual
property regime to take root. Part III provides a brief background
of the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) intellectual
property protection through the Host City Contract. Part IV
contrasts China's reactive approach in dealing with the United
States' external, political pressures to its proactive approach in
adapting the internal, nonpolitical standards of the IOC. This
section uses four factors expounded by Professor Peter K. Yu as a
framework in analyzinF the reasons for the United States' failure
and the IOC's success.' Part V argues that the Olympics' support
of the infant domestic intellectual property industry, coupled with
a transitioning legal system, will permanently change the foreign
intellectual property investment environment. Foreign pressure
and concern should be channeled into providing legal expertise
9. Marcus W. Brauchli & Joseph Kahn, Intellectual Property: China Moves Against
Piracy as U.S. Trade Battle Looms, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1995, at 1.
10. See Chris X. Lin, A Quiet Revolution: An Overview of China's Judicial Reform, 4
ASIAN-PAc. L. & POL'Y J. 256, 294 (2003), available at http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/
tableof contents/June2003artindex.html.
11. Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare
to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 6-7 (2001).
2005]
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and education in China, rather than using protectionist sanctions
that have historically proved futile. This comment concludes that
effective intellectual property enforcement may be achieved
through maintaining the Olympic momentum and fostering
intellectual property education in the rule of law, rather than
reverting to economic sanctions and threats of trade wars.
II. PARTY DISCRETION AND LEGAL REFORM TOWARD A RULE OF
LAW
Foreign pressure failed to improve China's intellectual
property protection in part because the foreign powers failed to
understand China's social and legal structure. Despite attempts to
increase regularity and predictability in legal rulings, China
remains "more a system of discretion supplemented by law than a
system of law supplemented by discretion."' 2
Party politics drive not only the administrative bureaucracy,
but also the judicial system. Officials wield discretionary power
over all laws in China, regardless of a law's textual meaning or
legislative intent." The traditional "rule by law" notion reflects the
Party-driven ideology that the Party creates laws to regulate
society and is not subject to its own laws. 4 Far from the American
construction of separation of powers, the judiciary is subject to
Party control, first through the Party's power to reopen an
underlying proceeding post-judgment, and second in the Party's
control over judicial appointments and salaries. 5 Until legal
reforms began to overhaul the existing institutional framework,
12. Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts, 8
PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 581, 615 (1999).
13. See STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER
MAO 140-42 (1999).
14. Lin, supra note 10, at 264.
15. Currently, the judiciary enjoys less direct interference, although the Party will still
interject in important cases. In 2002, the 16th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress
began to openly instill procedural reform and the elevation of the Constitution above the
Party in its new amendment to the Charter of the CCP. Lin, supra note 10, at 268. Many
Party leaders still believe that the law's purpose is to shape citizen behavior according to
Party policy, and not to subject the Party to the law itself. Id. at 263. See also ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIANFA [Constitution], pmbl., (P.R.C.), translated in THE LAWS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1979-1982, at 4 (1987).
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the Chinese judicial system rested at the mercy of the Party
politic.
16
Even when the problem of Party discretion became apparent,
external foreign pressure for China to move toward a stronger
"rule of law" still failed to account for the historically rooted
Confucian moral code, which strives for social harmony and
personal relationships over state coercion and impersonal
imposition of abstract rules. 7 This is the foundation and
justification for Mao's discretion-dominated system, in which
substantive justice and equality is prized over procedural rules.'
Informal mediation, which preserved the local social fabric within
villages, provinces, and other various localities, was preferred over
formal litigation.' 9 Thus, inconsistent judicial results stem not only
the fact that judicial discretion is driven by Party policy rather than
public policy, but also from the individualized administration of
justice. Internally, bureaucratic decentralization, coupled with the
Party's urge to micromanage, has resulted in conflicts between
local practices and official national legislation.2 °
The values underlying intellectual property rights conflicted
with the Confucian ideal, which stressed imitation and exact
copying as the ultimate form of flattery and respect.2' The concept
of intellectual property rights requires accetance of an
individual's property right as against all others, including the
16. See LUBMAN, supra note 13, at 214. Despite constitutional provisions creating an
independent judiciary, the long absence of the rule of law in China has intertwined the
judiciary with the Communist Party. See Lin, supra note 10, at 260-61.
17. Yu, supra note 11, at 16-21. See also Liwei Wang, The Chinese Traditions Inimical
to the Patent Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 15, 15-17 (1993).
18. See Yu, supra note 11, at 21-22.
19. Id. at 20. This underlying social order also explains the increasing popularity of
arbitration for dealing with commercial disputes involving Chinese companies, but arbitral
awards must still be enforced by a court. See, e.g., China Int'l Econ. & Trade Arbitration
Comm'n (CIETAC) website 4, at http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/introduction/
intro_2.htm (last visited Jul. 25, 2005) ("[Ilt is.. .true that a small number of local People's
Court[s] have improperly refused enforcement of the arbitral awards.").
20. See generally LUBMAN, supra note 13, at 198-99.
21. Yu, supra note 11, at 18-20.
22. The concept of intellectual property rights, as a right of an individual holder for
the purpose of financial gain, ran counter to Communist ideology. TAN LOKE KHOON &
CLIFFORD BORG-MARKS, TRADE MARK LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
210 (1998) [hereinafter KHOON & BORG-MARKS]. Intellectual property in China did not
exist as the term is now understood prior to 1984. For a definition of "intellectual
property" in the context of Chinese history, see MICHAEL D. PENDLETON,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1-3 (1986). See
2005]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 27:291
state.23 In contrast, under Confucian teachings, emulation was
prized over originality; memorization and duplication of
traditional works marked the well-learned citizen.24  Under
Communist ideology, Chinese citizens were to enjoy works
produced. 2' Thus, the absence of social value placed on proprietary
rights precluded Chinese society from seeing the benefits of
intellectual property protection.
While trademark and patent legislation did exist in the early
261980s, such laws did not establish private property rights.
Instead, they were tools of Party control in product differentiation
and quality as against the intellectual property holder rather than28
for the protection of trademark or patent owners. The 1982
Trademark Law, for example, did not protect service marks and• 29
business names. Business and service names were unprotected
until unfair competition legislation passed in 1993.'o Internal
changes and legal reforms did not begin to take stride until a new
also ZHENG CHENGSI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA: LEADING
CASES AND COMMENTARY 3-9 (1997) (commenting on the first intellectual property
court decision Jiang Sishen v. Qiao Xuezhu, reported only in a local newspaper).
23. See PENDLETON, supra note 22, at 1; PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CHINA 4 (2d ed. 2003).
24. Yu, supra note 11, at 17-18.
25. KHOON & BORG-MARKS, supra note 22, at 210.
26. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., COUNTRY PROFILE: CHINA 135,
available at http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/ipworldwide/pdf/cn.pdf (last visited Jul. 25,
2005).
27. FENG, supra note 23, at 191, 293-94.
28. Id. at 293. Intellectual property legislation can be traced back to the Tang Dynasty
(618-906 A.D.). These imperial decrees, however, were as much a tool for monarchial
control as the 1980s legislation was for Party control and censorship. Yu, supra note 11, at
4 (edicts were "mainly instituted to control the dissemination of ideas"); see also Perry
Keller, Privilege and Punishment. Press Governance in China, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 87, 89-90 (2003) ("Party Principle" subjects all media to the principles and directives
of the Chinese Communist Party).
29. PENDLETON, supra note 22, at 11. See also Yu, supra note 11, at 9-10 (despite
passage of 1982 Trademark Law, American businesses are impatient with lack of
improvement in intellectual property protection in China).
30. ZHONGHUA RENMNIN GONGHEGUO SHANGBIAOFA [Trademark Law of
P.R.C.], Fagui Huiban, translated in 2 CHINA L. FOREIGN BuS. 11, art. 3 (1982)
[hereinafter Trademark Law 1982]; ZHONGHUA RENMNIN GONGHEGUO SHANGBIAOFA
[Law of the People's Republic of China Against Unfair Competition], Fagui Huiban,
translated in THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1993, at 195 (1993)
[hereinafter Unfair Competition Law of P.R.C.]. See PENDLETON, supra note 22, at 10.
Currently, three institutions comprise the intellectual property enforcement infrastructure
in China: the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), the State Administration for
Industry and Commerce (SAIC), and the National Copyright Administration of China
(NCAC).
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generation of western-educated Chinese returned to China in the
31
post-Mao era.
Premier Wen Jiabao's new generation of Chinese leaders
marked significant change in Party ideology towards a market2
economy and an openness toward western ideas. Within the past
decade, Chinese legal reform rhetoric shifted from the traditional
"rule by law" ideology towards the modern "rule of law" concept.
33
The most important change in this shift was the idea that the
government ought to be bound within the limits of its laws. Instead
of vesting the Party with the ultimate interpretative and legislative
power as a tool for maintaining Party power, reform emphasized a
more independent judiciary. Because courts lack power of
judicial review, however, they remained subservient to the Party's
ultimate power of legislation and interpretation.3 ' This, along with
the entrenchment of the Maoist tradition of informal dispute
resolution free from procedural restraints, has slowed efforts to
increase transparency in the rule of law.
While courts are handling more IPR cases and new
intellectual property courts have been created, the apparent
progress is deceptive. First, court judgments are generally hard to
31. Many children of prominent Party leaders and the business elite are educated in
Western nations. See, e.g., Kathy Chen & Susan V. Lawrence, China's Premier Takes on
U.S., ASIAN WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL-WSJA 65018560.
32. Premier Wen's philosophy recognizes the need to participate in the market
economy. See id.
33. For a discussion on the recent development in "fazhi" (rule of law) versus the rule
by law interpretation and the old arbitrary "renzhi" (rule by man) system, see Lin, supra
note 10. See also LUBMAN, supra note 13, at 174-80, 306-19.
34. But see Woo, supra note 12, at 592. A series of procedural laws passed since 1978,
e.g., the Administrative Litigation Law of 1989, provide a glimpse of a fledging
independent judiciary granting citizens the power to challenge public agency actions in
court. The procedural laws in force are the Criminal Procedure Law of 1979, amended in
1996; Civil Procedure Law of 1991; and Administrative Litigation Law of 1989. Id. at 593.
A recent example of increased usage of the courts is a suit by a domestic patent holder
against the SIPO for negligently deleting contact information from a patent application.
ROUSE & CO. INT'L, The SIPO Ordered to Pay Compensation by Way of an
Administrative Fine, to a Patentee for Behavior Deemed to be a Misuse of Internal
Guidelines, CHINA IP EXPRESS, No. 190, Dec. 5, 2003, available at http://www.iprights.
com/publications/chinaipexpress/ciex_191.asp#2 (last visited Jul. 25, 2005).
35. See Lin, supra note 10, at 271 (quoting Professor Qiao Xinsheng, who argues that
despite no Marbury v. Madison type of judicial review, the judiciary should at least be able
to apply and enforce the constitution against the state).
2005]
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enforce due to protectionist discretion in local enforcement.
36
Judicial judgments are not bound by stare decisis because the
traditional goal is to provide substantive justice in accordance with
Party policy and not uniformity in application.37 Second, the
administrative law scheme, which runs parallel to the judicial
system, is currently more attractive to right-holders because it has
38
the power to both decide and administer punishment.
Nonetheless, the administrative bodies' broad discretionary power
makes prosecution and enforcement uncertain, while high
thresholds on the criminal elements of infringement and on
evidentiary matters make court victories unlikely.
Furthermore, because the most recent decrees and
regulations supersede all previous laws in conflict,4° Chinese law
lacks comprehensive codes rooted in developed jurisprudence.
Rather, conflicting decrees and regulations often exist across local-
national lines.4' In this incomplete state of reform, China's
traditional basis of the judiciary as an arm of the Party posed the
dilemma that even if a right-holder prevailed in court,
enforcement was another hurdle virtually independent of the
36. For a discussion of enforcement difficulties in general, see Mo Zhang,
International Civil Litigation in China: A Practical Analysis of the Chinese Judicial System,
25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 90-92 (2002).
37. Only the agency that promulgated the legislation, and in certain instances the
State Council or the National People's Congress (NPC), may interpret that legislation.
LUBMAN, supra note 13, at 205. Competition and corruption between local and national
levels make uniform enforcement even more elusive. Id.
38. The Administrative Punishment Law (APL) is one body that has attempted to
achieve transparency by requiring hearings before certain punishments can be carried out.
See LUBMAN, supra note 13, at 212; see generally PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM (1999). For criticism on
the use of the administrative law scheme, see FENG, supra note 23, at 16-17 (observing
that the "dual track" system has arguably "undermine[d] judicial independence").
39. Article 127 of the criminal law had a maximum three years imprisonment, later
extended to seven years in certain cases. Criminal Law of P.R.C., pt. I, ch. 1, art. 219,
Fagui Huibian (amended Mar. 14, 1997). available at http://www.qis.net/-chinalaw/
prclawl0.htm. Serious IPR infringement was criminalized by the 1997 revision of the PRC
Criminal Code; however, the death penalties imposed in certain cases were more a
function of Party control than an effort to increase intellectual property protection. See
Counterfeit Spirit Manufacturer Receives Death Penalty, CHINA L. & PRAC., Apr. 29, 1993,
at 20 (court imposed death sentence on distillery manager who severely disrupted socialist
economic order with counterfeit version of Maotai spirits); Paul B. Birden, Jr., Trademark
Protection in China: Trends and Directions, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. J. 431, 475-76
(1996).
40. Agency promulgations replace previous inconsistent decrees. FENG, supra note
23, at 13.
41. Id. at 12-13.
[Vol. 27:291
Great Olympics, New China
court's judgment.42 In the absence of a consistent rule of law in the
intellectual property context, all that really matters is whether
intellectual property protection is part of the Party's agenda. Until
IPR becomes part of the Party agenda, actual enforcement is lost
amidst the sea of discretionary bodies at the provincial, local, and
national levels, and across the administrative and judiciary sectors.
Thus, China's Party-centralized but unstable legal framework was
diametrically opposed to the concept of the lasting IPR43 and
current reform efforts continue to struggle against these traditional
forces.44 While China's membership in international treaties and its
numerous internal intellectual property regulations give the
appearance of a strong intellectual property state,45  China's
deficiency in enforcement is rooted in discretion.
III. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE OLYMPIC MARK
Before analyzing how the 2008 Olympics is positioned to
create a viable intellectual property infrastructure in China, a brief
42. Since the 1980s, China has developed an adversarial trial court system, but this
has proved insufficient without real reforms at the institutional level. Lin, supra note 10, at
257.
43. FENG, supra note 23, at 4-16.
44. Id. at 6.
45. China is now party to the following major international intellectual property
treaties and organizations: Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property
Organization, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (acceded on June 3, 1980) [hereinafter WIPO
Convention]; Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as
amended by Paris Additional Act and Declaration (1896), Berlin Convention (1908),
Berne Additional Protocol (1914), Rome Convention (1928), Brussels Convention (1948),
Stockholm Convention (1967), the Paris Convention (1971), Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S.
221 (acceded on Oct. 15, 1992) [hereinafter Berne Convention]; Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (acceded on Mar. 19,
1985) [hereinafter Paris Convention]; Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, opened .for signature Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 (acceded on
Oct. 4, 1989), and Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the
International Registration of Marks, adopted June 28, 1989, 9 INDUS. PROP. LAWS &
TREATIES, at Multilateral Treaties-Text 3-007 (World Intellectual Prop. Org. No.
609(E), July/Aug. 1989) (acceded in Sept. 1995) [hereinafter Madrid Protocol];
Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized
Duplication of Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 866 U.N.T.S. 178 (acceded on Apr. 30,
1993) [hereinafter Geneva Phonograms]; Nice Agreement Concerning the International
Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June
15, 1957, 550 U.N.T.S. 45 (acceded on Aug. 9, 1994) [hereinafter Nice Agreement];
Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, revised July 24, 1971, 6 U.S.T. 2731
(acceded on Oct. 15, 1992) [hereinafter UCC].
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discussion of how the Olympics movement generally affects
intellectual property protection is necessary.
Intellectual property protection is central to the multi-billion
dollar Olympics enterprise. For example, the Sydney 2000 summer
games single-handedly garnered over three billion dollars.4 6 Much
of this revenue was earned through licensing the IOC's exclusive
marks: the Olympic symbol, motto, flag, emblems, anthem, flame,
and torch.47 The IOC Charter grants broad and exclusive rights to
the IOC, including "all rights and data relating [to the Olympic
Games] without limitation. ' '48 The revenue raised by the protected
marks helps toward funding the Olympic Games and globally
promotes the sports movement.49
Given the large revenue at stake, enforcement of the IOC's
IPR is a primary concern. ° As an international organization, the
IOC's intellectual property standards are its own, separate and
apart from the nation that happens to host the games in any given
year. Under the Olympic Charter, "[t]he IOC may take all
appropriate steps to obtain the legal protection... [both on] a
46. This figure includes pre-Olympic promotional revenue and residual tourist
revenue of the Sydney Organizing Committee and the IOC between 1997 and 2004. See
SYDNEY MARKETING REVIEW, THE IMPACT OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES 95 (2001)
[hereinafter SYDNEY MARKETING REVIEW].
47. The IOC is the main governing body over all Olympic activities. INT'L OLYMPIC
COMM., OLYMPIC CHARTER 8, available at http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/
en-report_122.pdf (Sept. 1, 2004) [hereinafter OLYMPIC CHARTER]. The Olympic symbol
consists of the five interlocking rings in blue, yellow, black, green, and red, representing
the union of the five continents; the Olympic flag is a borderless white flag with the
Olympic symbol in the center; the Olympic motto is "Citius. Altius. Fortius"; the Olympic
emblems are any designs integrating the Olympic symbol with another "distinctive
element"; and the Olympic anthem is the score approved in Tokyo in 1958. Id. at 15-16.
See Laura Misener, Safeguarding the Olympic Insignia: Protecting the Commercial Integrity
of the Canadian Olympic Association, 13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 79 (2002) (discussing
efforts made by Canadian Olympic Association to protect Olympic marks and indicia
within Canada).
48. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 47, at 15. The broad language of the Charter
grants the IOC all rights to the Games' "organisation [sic], exploitation, broadcasting,
recording, representation, reproduction, access and dissemination in any form and by any
means or mechanism whatsoever, whether now existing or developed in the future." Id.
49. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 47, at 11-12, 37.
50. "Use of the Olympic Symbol" is the first category listed in the Candidature file
for important legal issues the candidate city must address, and three of the seven legal
issues highlighted relate to intellectual property. See INT'L OLYMPICS COMM., MANUAL
FOR CANDIDATE CITIES FOR THE GAMES OF THE XXIX OLYMPIAD, Theme 2(a), (e), (f)
(2002), available at http://multimedia.olympic.org/ pdf/enjreport_297.pdf (last visited Jul.
25, 2005) [hereinafter MANUAL].
[Vol. 27:291300
Great Olympics, New China
national and international basis, [of the Olympic marks]."51 The
Olympic Games' prestige and the fiercely competitive bidding
process place the IOC in the position to dictate necessary IPR
protections from the host country. In this sense, the IOC achieves
a standard of international protection for its own trademark
through the Host City Contract ("Contract").
Olympic mark infringement can only be controlled, however,
and not eliminated, even in countries with the most sophisticated
IPR framework.52 The Contract is the primary means of ensuring
Olympic mark protection throughout the pre- and post- Olympic
period.53 The IOC selects a host city for each Olympiad, and a
National Olympics Committee (NOC) is established in the host
country. The IOC Contract governs three parties: the IOC, the
host city, and the host city's NOC. 4 The Contract takes
precedence over any conflicting action that the city or its NOC
may take.5
The Contract grants limited use of Olympic mark rights to the
NOC and requires additional approval from the IOC Executive
Board for further use.56 Throughout the agreement, the IOC
maintains strict control over its intellectual property, enlisting the
NOC and the host state to vigorously protect the Olympic marks.57
51. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 47, at 17. The IOC attempted to gain legal
protection on an international level for the Olympic symbol through the Nairobi Treaty on
the International Protection of the Olympic Symbol ("Nairobi Treaty"). Nairobi Treaty on
the Protection of the Olympic Symbol, adopted Sept. 26, 1981, 1863 U.N.T.S. 367
(currently forty-one signatories). Without international enforcement mechanisms and
major power signatories, however, this treaty merely reaffirms international recognition of
the Olympic symbol as a well-known mark.
52. Perfect intellectual property enforcement was never the goal in China, or
anywhere else. Even in the United States' strong intellectual property enforcement
environment, infringement is a continual problem. See Paula L. Green, Counterfeiters Go
for the Gold at the Olympics, J. COMMERCE, July 22, 1996, at IA (describing U.S. efforts
to protect Olympic marks in the 1996 Atlanta Games). Because intellectual property is a
social and cultural concept rooted in policy, no international norms exist except by
agreement. Necessarily territorial in scope, what may be protected intellectual property in
one country may not be eligible for protection in another, either by shrinking the scope of
protected intellectual property, or by varying the definition of what constitutes intellectual
property. There is no jus cogens norm like in the area of human rights. Cf PENDLETON,
supra note 22, at 1-3.
53. The Host City Contract obligates the IOC, NOC, and the host city from the
moment the host city is selected. MANUAL, supra note 50, at Theme 2.
54. See MANUAL, supra note 50, at Introduction, Theme 2.
55. See id. at Theme 2(b).
56. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 47, at 18.
57. Id. at 18-19.
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While the NOC can create its own unique Olympic emblems for
the hosted event, the Olympic Charter bylaws dictate strict spatial
layout for the emblem, as well as other conditions that must be
satisfied. One such condition is the requirement of legal protection
within the NOC and in other countries specified by the IOC.58 All
contracts for the use of the Olympic marks by any Organizing
Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG) must be finalized by
December 31st of the year in which the games are held.59
China has taken a multifaceted approach under the guidance
of the IOC. The Beijing Host City Contract ("Beijing Contract")
requires protection of two main categories of Olympic marks: the
IOC's marks and the Beijing Organizing Committee of the
Olympic Games' (BOCOG) marks. 0 The BOCOG marks and
61
symbols include the Chinese Olympic mark logo, mascot, names,
symbols, anthems, and their slogan: "New Beijing Great
Olympics."62 To satisfy China's obligations under the Beijing
Contract, a series of Olympics-specific intellectual property
decrees and regulations were passed, including the Protection of
Olympic Intellectual Property Provisions by the Beijing
Municipality, the Regulations on the Protection of Olympic
Insignia,6 and the Measures for the Recordal and Administration
of Olympic Insignia.65 The purpose of these additional regulations
is more than mere emphasis; failure to fulfill the Beijing Contract
with respect to intellectual property enforcement means Beijing
could lose certain subsidies that are contingent on enforcement
results.66
58. Id. at 18.
59. Id. at 19.
60. See id. at 18.
61. E.g., "Beijing 2008," "Olympiad," and "Olympics." Regulations on the Protection
of Olympic Symbols, Decree 345, entered into force Apr. 1, 2002, at http://en.beijing-
2008.org/91/39/article2ll6l3991.shtml (last visited Jul. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Decree 345].
62. Liu Li, Olympic Symbols Receive Protection, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 1, 2003,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-04/01/content_160212.htm [hereinafter Olympic
Symbols Receive Protection].
63. Protection of Olympic Intellectual Property Provisions by the Beijing
Municipality, entered into force Nov. 1, 2001. Wang Jun, Olympic Emblem Is Safe and
Sealed, 46 BEIJING REV. 28 (2003).
64. Decree 345, supra note 61.
65. See Jun, supra note 63.
66. See e.g., INT'L OLYMPIC COMM., REPORT OF THE IOC EVALUATION
COMMISSION FOR THE GAMES OF THE XXIX OLYMPIAD IN 2008, 62-64, 69, 71 (Apr. 3,
2001) [hereinafter IOC EVALUATION REPORT] (allocating 118 million USD for
sustainable development in Beijing; 400 million USD for healthcare facility improvements;
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The Olympic Games' massive scale leaves no host city
unchanged.67 Given the IOC's dependence on intellectual property
revenue, the IOC took a leap of faith in designating China as host
city for the 2008 Olympics. Considering China's accession to the
WTO later that year on December 11, 2001,69 the IOC took
China's word that Olympic mark protection would be
guaranteed.7 ° China's greatest potential for change in the wake of
the Olympic Games is in its IPR enforcement infrastructure.
IV. REACTION AND PROACTION: CHINA'S DIFFERING RESPONSES
TO FOREIGN POLITICS AND THE IOC
If China sought entry into the WTO to become a major world
economic player, why did it fail to proactively create an
intellectual property regime conducive to its goals? The answer
lies in a Chinese tradition antithetical to the concept of intellectual
property and China's deep distrust of foreigners. China lacks the
institutional framework necessary to successfully implement a
regime of IPR enforcement. A fundamental disconnect, fueled by
external foreign pressures perceived as exploitative by the
Chinese, hindered China's path to creating an effective intellectual
property regime.
Foreign pressure, particularly by the United States, wanted
too much too soon. Failing to account for China's socialist
underpinnings and the lack of intellectual property infrastructure,
foreign pressure only increased China's distrust. Professor Peter
Yu attributes the United States' failure to convert China into an
intellectual property regime to four factors:
50 million USD for a contingency fund, and also billions of dollars in non-BOCOG
investments into the transportation infrastructure and environmental clean-up).
67. Sydney 2000, the largest summer games undertaking thus far, transformed
Australia's world image and tourism industry. See SYDNEY MARKETING REVIEW, supra
note 46, at 95.
68. The IOC has taken precautions against such a blind leap, strengthening
international protection for the Beijing logo more than for any previous Olympic Games.
See Michel Jen-Siu, Long-Awaited Olympic Logo to be Revealed, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 1, 2003, at 6. See also Tom O'Byrne, China's Campaign Against Brand Piracy,
WORLD TODAY ARCHIVE, http://ww.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s650903.htm (last
visited Jul. 25, 2005). Some have analogized China's intellectual property situation to that
of South Korea's transformation during its Olympic bid for the 1988 Olympic Games, but
this view is not widely held. See Steve Freiss, The Trouble with Olympic Trinkets, USA
TODAY, Dec. 12, 2001, at 6B.
69. See Accession of the People's Republic of China, supra note 2, at 1, 11.
70. See IOC EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 66, at 64.
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(1) The United States' failure to consider the relevance of its
imposed regime,
(2) The United States' inability to convince China of the
domestic benefits of IPR,
(3) The United States' failure to reach out to domestic IPR
owners, and
(4) The United States' failure to provide training and education
on intellectual property basics."
These factors set up a framework for analyzing this reactive
and proactive dichotomy. In contrast to the failures of foreign
efforts, the IOC's involvement in China's preparation for the
Olympics satisfies each of these factors, further supporting the
prospect that China will develop foundational intellectual property
structures through Olympics-motivated changes.
Now that the United States is again stirring threatening
rhetoric against China, these factors reveal that such an approach
promises to be as fruitless as it has been in the past. During China-
U.S. bilateral negotiations in 1979, 1992, 1995, 1996, and 1999,
China reacted to U.S. demands just enough and just in time to
72
ward off trade sanctions.
The Olympics, in contrast, is spurring China to become
internally proactive in the post-Olympic bid years toward Olympic
mark protection. Conspicuously absent in pre-Olympic bid China
was state motivation to enforce IPR. When China sought to host
the Olympics, it understood the primary importance of the JOC's
intellectual property enforcement expectations.73 Pressure to meet
71. Yu, supra note 11, at 6-7.
72. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China, July 7, 1979, U.S.-P.R.C., 1202 U.N.T.S. 179 [hereinafter 1979
Agreement]; Memorandum of Understanding Between China and the United States on
the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17, 1992, P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 677
[hereinafter 1992 MOU]; Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, Feb. 26,
1995, P.R.C.-U.S., 34 I.L.M. 881 [hereinafter 1995 Agreement]. Kim Newby, The
Effectiveness of Special 301 in Creating Long Term Copyright Protection for U.S.
Companies Overseas, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 29, 42-44 (1995).
73. See INT'L OLYMPICS COMM., QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CITIES APPLYING TO
BECOME CANDIDATE CITIES TO HOST THE GAMES OF THE XXIX OLYMPIAD IN 2008
(Feb. 24, 2000), at http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/ en-report_288.pdf [hereinafter
QUESTIONNAIRE].
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the IOC's enforcement standards is non-politics based74 and the
IOC's exacting standards are supervised at each steg to guide the
host city in satisfying the enforcement requirements.
A. Four Factor Analysis
The first factor--the relevance of a foreign imposed regime--
encompasses two aspects. The Party simply did not see the need to
protect foreign intellectual property because (1) of its distrust of
foreigners, and (2) it needed to acquire foreign technological
76know-how. By ignoring China's lack of domestic intellectual
property enforcement regime, the United States failed in its
attempt to have China enforce foreign intellectual property rights.
China was not convinced of the reasons behind IPR enforcement.
Instead of educating China on how intellectual property could
benefit domestic IPR holders, the United States blindly expected
that the wholesale importation of international intellectual
property treaties would bring effective enforcement for foreign IP
holders.
U.S.-China bilateral negotiations in the latter half of the 20th
century repeatedly illustrate the United States' failure to convince
China of the relevance of the U.S. imposed regime. China wanted
to accede to the WTO, and each round of negotiations showed
China's resolve to remove U.S.-set barriers to the path of
accession.77 The United States' arsenal in its China policy consisted
74. The Olympic Charter explicitly disassociates its mission at all levels from global
politics. National Olympic Committees "must preserve their autonomy and resist all
pressures of any kind, including those of a political, religious or economic pressures which
may prevent them from complying with the Olympic Charter." OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra
note 47, at 40. Moreover, "[g]overnments or other public authorities shall not designate
any members of an NOC." Id. at 42.
75. See id. at 63.
76. China's main interest was to shed foreign advantage, and tried to leverage legal
reforms against the western powers. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK IS AN
ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 13, 29
(1995).
77. China made its first modern trade concessions in economic policy during its
bilateral negotiations with the United States beginning in 1979. See 1979 Agreement, supra
note 72. At the forefront of WNTO negotiations were lowering tariffs and eliminating non-
tariff barriers. The 1979 Agreement, negotiated against the backdrop of the 1947 General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, focused on "products," and ignored intellectual
property. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Daniel H. Rosen, American Access to China's
Market: The Congressional Vote on PNTR, INT'L ECON. POLICY BRIEFS, No. 00-3, Apr.
2000, available at http://207.238.152.36/policybriefs/news00-3.htm.
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of threats of imposing Smoot-Hawley tariffs on Chinese imports,
Special Section 301 Proceedings,7 9 and measures aimed at forcing
China to lower its walls while at the same time raising the United
States' own walls of protectionism. The Agreement on Trade
Relations between the United States of America and the People's
Republic of China in 1979 ("1979 Agreement") required
reciprocal treatment of intellectual property rights between the
two states. After a series of eleventh hour agreements,g most
notably the 1995 Agreement, which required the most pre-
accession internal legislative change, China achieved international
standards for intellectual property legislative protection.81 U.S.
opposition to China's entry into the WTO reached a turning point
with this 1995 Agreement. With the numerous IPR concessions
required under the agreement, China had satisfied U.S. demands,
at least for the time being.82
China's reactive stance to foreign thteats held especially true
in the area of intellectual property since, relative to the more
pressing issue of market-entry barriers, intellectual property was
not at the forefront of China's pre-accession agenda. For example,
in the 1992 bilateral Memorandum of Understanding ("1992
MOU"), China's cautiously reacted to U.S. demands following the
United States' act of naming China as a Priority Foreign Country
83under Special Section 301. Under Article 3(3) of the 1992 MOU,
China accepted the supremacy of these international treaties over
its domestic laws, bringing them within the application of the
People's Republic of China (PRC) Civil Code, article 142.84 China,
78. These tariffs, implemented during the Depression, can be as high as 50% ad
valorem. Id.
79. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-148, § 1302(a),
102 Stat. 1176 (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2420 (1994)). See
generally Newby, supra note 72 (describing Section 301 Proceedings). Both the 1992 MOU
and the 1995 MOU were in response to the United States' act of placing China on the
Special 301 priority lists. See Patrick H. Hu, "Mickey Mouse" in China: Legal and Cultural
Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT'L L. J. 81, 82 (1996).
80. See agreements listed, supra note 72.
81. For an account of U.S.-China bilateral negotiations leading up to China's
accession, see Yu, supra note 11.
82. See Hu, supra note 79; see also Brauchli & Kahn, supra note 9 (quoting Li
Changxu, head of the China United Intellectual property Investigation Center: "This is the
way America does business. It puts on lots of pressure, acts very strong.. .[but just before
the deadline, they'll [sic] be concessions and a compromise").
83. See 1992 MOU, supra note 72.
84. Id.; General Principles of the Civil Code of P.R.C., art. 142, Apr. 21, 1986.
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however, was not about to embrace an IPR regime that required it
to revamp the foundational principles of its existing system. To
counter this concession, China placed as many interim steps as
possible between foreign intellectual property right holders and
85state protection.
Furthermore, the imported international treaties had been
created by developed countries and thus lacked relevance to
China's foreign policy agenda. As a state-centralized and state-
controlled economy, China historically guarded itself from foreign
investment.86 Until recently, the central state controlled nearly all
economic modalities, from property to most industries.87 Against
this backdrop of state control and China's long-standing distrust of
all things Western, it is unsurprising that China balked at foreign
pressure to protect foreign intellectual property rights.8 Given the
Party's control over its citizens, any argument for affording
individual rights to foreigners against the central state would be
unavailing. International disapproval and the United States'
economic threats, sanctions, and opposition to China's entry into
the WTO could not have succeeded in convincing the Party of the
importance of intellectual property protection for foreign
investors. s9 These constant threats exacerbated China's distrust
and perpetuated China's unwillingness to give in to U.S.
demands.
From the United States' perspective, the WTO's intellectual
property agreement-TRIPS-which required China to expand and
translate the treaties it had already acceded to under previous
bilateral agreements with the United States into domestic law, was
supposed to safeguard IP rights. Under TRIPS, the United States
could resort to the WTO dispute settlement procedures, effectively
legitimizing its previously unilateral economic sanctions under the
WTO's reciprocity provisions. While China did overhaul its
85. One example is requiring Chinese language filing by a Chinese agent. FENG,
supra note 23.
86. China's perspective is common among developing nations and emerging markets.
See ALFORD, supra note 76.
87. China was neither a common law nor a civil code country to the extent seen in
European nations like France or Germany. The People's Republic of China did not
establish a civil law framework until 1986. FENG, supra note 23, at 5.
88. See ALFORD, supra note 76, at 117-18; see also LUBMAN, supra note 13, at 313.
89. Yu, supra note 11, at 131.
90. Id. See Robert S. Greenberger et al., China Warns Washington of Reprisals,
WALL ST. J., May 13, 1996, at A2.
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domestic Trademark Law and Patent Law to comply with the
TRIPS Agreement, 9 the United States continued to voice its
intent to resort to WTO-sanctioned retaliation.
Furthermore, in the pre-accession period, the WTO members
primarily focused on trade issues and bootstrapped intellectual
property into negotiations as they placed external, politically-
based pressure on China. Because the WTO encompasses a
comprehensive range of trade issues, WTO members' emphasis on
various other WTO obligations allowed China the opportunity to
re-prioritize intellectual property enforcement off the to-do list.9'
The result is a grudgingly compliant state that did not understand
the relevance of intellectual property protection to its agenda. 93 As
the accession cloud cleared, China's deficiency in IPR enforcement
became globally transparent.
Professor Yu's second and third factors-the United States'
inability to convince China of the domestic benefits of protecting
intellectual property rights, and failure to reach out to domestic
intellectual property right owners-both point to a common
failure. The domestic intellectual property industry is the foreign
91. Both the Trademark Law and the Patent Law were revised in 2001. The 2001
Trademark Law went into effect on December 1, 2001, and the 2001 Patent Law revisions
went into effect on July 1, 2001. FENG, supra note 23, at 299. Compare Trademark Law
1982, supra note 30, with ZHONGHUA RENMNIN GONGHEGUO SHANGBIAOFA
[Trademark Law of P.R.C.], Fagui Huiban, translated in 2 CHINA L. FOREIGN Bus. 11
(1993) and Trademark Law 2001, available at http://www.trademarkpatent.com.cn/EN/
default/laws/laws list-trade.asp?epic_mode=ee (Dec. 1, 2001). For example, pursuant to
the revised provisions of the Trademark Law of 2001, non-merchant individuals were
allowed to register marks as private property and three-dimensional designs and color
combinations were also accepted for the first time as marks. Implementing Regulations for
the Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China, 5 CHINA L. UPDATE 10 (Sept.
2002) (outlining changes in the 2001 Trademark Law). A Working Conference on
Intellectual Property Rights was established to study progress in IPR enforcement. See
KHOON & BORG-MARKS, supra note 22, at 61.
92. One primary post-accession objective on the U.S. agenda, for example, is getting
China to float its currency at market rates to the U.S. dollar instead of pegging it to the
dollar at a fixed rate of exchange. See U.S. Dep't of State, China Not Fulfilling All WTO
Commitments, USTR Says, Sept. 24, 2003, at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/ (transcript
of statement by Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Charles W. Freeman III to
the Congressional - Executive Comm. on China) [hereinafter Freeman statement].
93. Two years after China acceded to the WTO and more than fifteen years after
China's bilateral negotiations with the United States began, domestic enforcement has not
kept pace with China's promises in the multitude of signed decrees and regulations
purporting to increase penalties for infringement. State Council's Development Research
Center estimated the counterfeit problem at 160 billion to 200 billion RMB (19 billion to
24 billion USD) in 2001. See id. at 93.
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right-holder's biggest ally, and the United States failed to
emphasize China's two domestic beneficiaries: the Party, and the
domestic individual right-holder. Foreign interest in China's
intellectual property regime lay only in protecting foreign
intellectual property investments, adding to China's distrust of
foreign motives. Just as the United States failed to show the Party
the potential benefit of intellectual property enforcement to
China's interests, it also failed to reach out to the domestic holders
of intellectual property.
Since China was not convinced of the benefit of
institutionalizing IPR protection, China did not embrace treaty
requirements and instead made empty promises. China limited the
effects of its negotiated concessions to open its markets by strictly
regulating foreign investment.94  Some regulations were as
draconian as the transfer of ownership to similar domestic
enterprises after a certain time period.5 The dwarfed social
understanding of IPR paralleled the historical political distrust and
rejection of foreign legal systems.96 In either case, protecting
intellectual property rights was an abstract concept that ran
counter to China's goals.
The fourth factor-failure to provide training and education on
intellectual property basics-has become one of the most
prominent criticisms of the United States' past approaches. In the
United States' defense, it would have been hard-pressed to gain
the access necessary to implement such training. Even if foreign
training and education had been demanded in trade negotiations,
as it was to an extent in the 1995 Agreement, distrust of foreigners
would have hampered the potential success of such programs. For
example, private foreign investors could have, but did not attempt,
a massive educational campaign. By virtue of being foreigners, this
would have placed their business images at risk. Instead, foreign
investors and businesses attempted to work around the existing
94. Until recently, China's investment laws kept most industries under state control.
Recent law has begun to allow wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries in China. Nationwide
Checks Set on Intellectual Property Rights, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 27, 2002, at http://china.
9c9c.com/politics-andreligions/.
95. This was done as part of a movement to "catch up" to the West. See Freeman
statement, supra note 92.
96. LUBMAN, supra note 13, at 2.
2005]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 27:291
system rather than fight it, oftentimes writing it off as part of the
cost of doing business in China.97
B. The IOC Made Intellectual Property Protection Relevant to
China, and Helped Jumpstart China's Infant Intellectual Property
Industry
In contrast to cornering China into a reactive position, the
Olympics gives China the unique opportunity to prove itself on the
world's cultural stage. In stark contrast to the pre-accession
negotiations which did not conclude with specific and relevant
intellectual property demands, 98 the IOC and the IOC Charter
provide precise and specific protections while remaining flexible in
application, since they must adapt to each host city's legal system.99
Preparation for Olympics 2008 has revealed fundamental
change in Party attitude toward intellectual property enforcement
from reactive to proactive. China sought to host the Olympics and
understood the IOC's IPR protection expectations. Winning the
2008 Olympics bid has not only given China a chance to
demonstrate its cultural prowess, but it has also made intellectual
property enforcement relevant to the Party agenda. As the host
country, China must be proactive toward Olympic mark protection
97. A senior official of Sony Music's Shanghai subsidiary recognized that "people just
don't have such awareness and responsibility" to pay royalties for use in karaoke clubs.
Shanghai Daily, Karaoke Bars Skip Royalties, Jan. 8, 2004, available at 2004 WL 56676280.
98. In the past, the United States has rarely gone beyond vague demands in the area
of intellectual property protection. See Jacques de Lisle, Lex Americana?: United States
Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist
World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179, 255 (1999). And to the extent that
intellectual property demands were specific, they might have been inconsistent within the
context of other demands and activities. See Steven Mufson, Americans Battle, Bargain
with Chinese; While Officials Threaten Trade Sanctions, Businessmen Seek Deals, WASH.
POST, Feb. 24, 1995, A17; see also Michael N. Schlesinger, A Sleeping Giant Awakens: The
Development of Intellectual Property Law in China, 9. J. CHINESE L. 93, 94 (1995)
(discussing how U.S. demands for improvements in copyright piracy prosecution and
intellectual property damage awards minimized the significance of China's substantive
compliance with TRIPS and strengthening judicial enforcement of intellectual property
rights).
99. The United States has only recently begun to bring specific IP concerns to the
table, including strategies and aid for improving China's intellectual property enforcement
infrastructure. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Important for U.S. that China Play by Rules of
Trade, Official Says (Sept. 25, 2003) (overview and transcript of testimony by Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Asia Pacific Policy Henry Levine to the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China), at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/
display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2003&m=September&x=20030925145556kaisn0.47193
55&t-xarchives/xarchitem.html. [hereinafter Levine's Testimony].
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because its international reputation is at stake for its zealous
promises made as an Olympics host candidate. China is both aware
of the importance of Olympic mark protection to the IOC and
wants to maximize its return on the 2008 Olympics investment.
After a near miss for the coveted spot of 2000 Olympics
host, 1°° Beijing was awarded the 2008 Host City Contract on July
13, 2001.01 In making this prospect a reality, China pulled out all
the stops when the Olympics team came to inspect Beijing,
investing over $20 million for the Olympic bid alone. °2 The
Olympics Committee report on Beijing's readiness to host in 2008
appeared optimistic. A closer look reveals that the government
shut down polluting factories, closed streets, and even spray-
painted the grass green on the main streets.0 3
China's budget for the 2008 Olympics-$23 billion-is more
than seven times the budget of Sydney 2000.' 04 This expenditure
illustrates the massive undertaking of reconstructing China's
infrastructure. While China is already at the forefront of the global
electronics trade, by 2008 Beijing will become a high-technology
society.' 5
Olympic marks will saturate China's licensing market over the
next five years because of the excitement that surrounds the
Olympic Games.' 6 The Olympic licensing program is set to
officially begin in 2004, and already forty-five Olympics-related
trademarks have been registered.)° Awareness of the licensing
system is increasing as smaller local firms gear up to participate in
the Olympic licensing market. 0 8 Exclusive Olympics broadcasting
100. China lost to Sydney by two votes to host the 2000 Olympics. Charles L.
Thornton, International Politics & the Modern Olympic Movement: China 2000: Case
Study, at http://www.dctkd.org/library/papers/olympics/site.cfm (last updated July 6, 2004).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The Olympic organizing budget alone is $1.6 billion. Evelyn Iritani, Rings Around
Beijing: China's $23-Billion Plan for 2008 Games is the Olympic Gold for U.S. Companies,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2002, at Al.
105. For example, plans are under way by the State Administration of Radio, Film and
Television to outfit thirty-three major Chinese cities with digital television by 2005 in
preparation for Olympics 2008. Xin Dinding, Major Cities to Shut Off Analogue
Television, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 27, 2003, available at 2003 WL 57560467.
106. See Global News Wire, Licensing Program to Kick Off Early Next Year, BUS.
DAILY UPDATE, Oct. 24, 2003, at § 24 [hereinafter Licensing Program to Kick Off Early
Next Year].
107. Id.
108. See id.
2005]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
will further expand the infrastructure for future licensing
potential.'09
The Olympics will bring to China an influx of the best
technical capabilities, project management expertise, and
environmental technology. China's preference for joint-ventures
will ensure that the technology is transferred to outfit Chinese
capability once the Olympics end.1 ° By 2008, China will be
fundamentally different from China in 2003.111
In the United States, where IPR protection is deemed one of
the most extensive in the world, undertaking Olympics
enforcement is still a difficult and expensive task.' Ironically,
despite the criticism of China's discretionary enforcement,
administrative discretionary enforcement works to the IOC's
advantage. The 2008 Olympic emblem was launched on August 3,
2003.113 By August 12, fines on unauthorized emblem use on 134
seized clothing items were already collected." 4 In April 2003, four
months before Beijing's emblem launch, more than 130,000
unauthorized IOC Olympic symbols had already been
confiscated. 5 China promises to "bring [IP] violators to justice."
' 6
This strong rhetoric goes against China's traditional view of
nonexistent IPR, and more recently as something only for
domestic IP holders. IP piracy has not been traditionally viewed as
a crime punishable with prison time. " '
109. See Agreements Signed for JV Company to Broadcast 2008, Beijing 2008, at
http://en.beijing-2008.org/66/93/article211619366.shtml (May 27, 2004). The Beijing
Olympic Broadcasting Co., Ltd. was established as a subsidiary of the IOC. People's Daily
Online, Broadcasting Program of Beijing Olympics Kicked Off, Oct. 28, 2004, at
http://english.people.com.cn/200410/28/eng20041028_161973.html.
110. Iritani, supra note 104.
111. See Ken Hoover, Led by a Hot China, Asian Funds Soar, INVESTOR'S Bus.
DAILY, Aug. 22, 2003, at A06.
112. Green, supra note 52 (The United States undertook a $1 million campaign for
Olympics enforcement during the Atlanta Games, the most comprehensive campaign in
Olympic history).
113. See Liu Li, Emblem Vital to Games Marketing, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 4, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 57559083.
114. People's Daily, China Works to Protect Official Emblem of 2008 Olympics,
available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn (last updated Aug. 14, 2003) [hereinafter
China Works to Protect Official Emblem].
115. Olympic Symbols Receive Protection, supra note 62.
116. Jen-Siu, supra note 68.
117. See Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in
China: Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 1081, 1108
(1996); see also Jen-Siu, supra note 68.
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The Olympic Games, however, sends an honorable message
and promotes a noble goal, something that everyone can respect,
as well as distinguish the goals of IPR enforcement from the
visions of greedy corporations normally associated with foreign
IPR. In the remaining years leading up to 2008, China will see, and
is indeed already seeing, a major crackdown on Olympic
trademark infringement.
The non-political nature of the IOC's IPR protection
standards is non-threatening to China, thus making the benefits
even more apparent. The IOC, as an organization, is as non-
partisan as Switzerland is in world politics.18 Even the subject of
human rights, a sensitive topic that led many WTO members to
oppose China's accession, is expressly rejected by the IOC in its
selection of a host city as being too politically charged. 9 China
does not apply its suspicion normally reserved for Western politics
toward the Olympics' benign objectives. Furthermore, China's
successful participation in past Olympiads involves the Chinese
masses in the process. China believes, as does the IOC, that
hosting the Olympics is a game in which everybody wins.
To domestic businesses and individuals, the Olympic marks
bring concrete benefits. The Olympics present authorized
domestic businesses with promotion and profit opportunities on an
incredible scale, both domestically and internationally."'
Souvenirs, shirts, and hats authorized by the BOCOG to celebrate
122the emblem launching sold out within a day.
An example of the domestic businesses' increasing awareness
and desire to reap benefits from intellectual property lies in the
118. In fact, the IOC is domiciled there. OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 47.
119. See IOC Inspectors Reiterate Their Position of "Sport, No Politics," Official
Website of the BOCOG, at http://210.75.208.159/eolympic/ztq/iockc/02243.htm (on file
with Loyola of Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review).
120. In contrast, while the ideological basis of the VTO is the long-term "everybody
wins" mantra in a world of economic free trade, short-term problems make the WTO
game appear very much comprised of winners and losers. See, e.g., TRADE COMPLIANCE
CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF COMM., CHINA TRADE 1995-2002 (2003) (noting that the trade
deficit has been one area of worry ever since the United States became China's largest
export market in 1999, with the post-accession deficit increasing dramatically to over $43
billion in 2002, up $15 billion from 2001 figures). Global politics, particularly current U.S.
rhetoric and policy toward China, is reminiscent of the threats previously employed
against China in pre-WTO times.
121. Zhang Lu, Beijingers Go Mad over Souvenirs, CHINA DAILY, Aug. 5, 2003,
available at 2003 WL 57559132.
122. See id.
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exploitation of the BOCOG's failure to register the emblem as a
design patent. The BOCOG registered the 2008 Olympic logo
under the relevant trademark and copyright laws, but did not
register the marks and emblems as design patents. 3 This
apparently placed the BOCOG in the awkward position of having
to pay royalties to individuals who had registered the emblems as
design patents. 24 BOCOG officials, however, maintained that the
BOCOG obtained prior rights to the emblem through trademark
registration, and thus the individual registration was void.125 This
highly publicized situation shows a new, albeit incomplete,
understanding of the registration requirement, which was not in
place until recently.1 26 Despite the pitfalls inherent in the learning
process, domestic businesses, along with the Chinese government,
understand the potential of having an enforceable intellectual
property right.
While the investment influx over the past few decades has
made large-scale businessmen and sophisticated international
traders aware of the need for effective intellectual property
protection, the majority of the Chinese population remains
unaware of such a concept.127 The stream of commerce, however, is
not confined to major trading cities, and neither are Olympic mark
counterfeiters.'9 With China's reputation at stake, having made
lofty promises to the IOC, China has been making its crackdown
effort highly public to show its commitment to the world. Such
publicity has also produced the side effect of disseminating
intellectual property rights understanding to its own citizens.
Finally, the controversial training and education factor is not
so controversial where the Olympics are concerned. The IOC's
123. See Legal Statement of the BOGOC & Post Office of the Beijing 2008 Olympic
Games Bid Committee, Legal Statement, at http://210.75.208.159/eolympic/ztq/legal-
statement/ statement.html (Aug. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Legal Statement].
124. Rouse & Co. Int'l, Requirement for the BOCOG to Pay Royalties for the Olympic
2008 Emblems, Which had been Filed by Other Patent Owners, CHINA IP EXPRESS, No.
191, Dec. 3, 2003, available at http://www.iprights.com/publications/chinaipexpress/
ciexl9l.asp [hereinafter BOCOG to Pay Royalties].
125. Id.
126. Michael D. Pendleton, Chinese Intellectual Property-Some Global Implications
for Legal Culture and National Sovereignty, 15 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 119 (1993) (only
computer software requires copyright registration, which then only indicated proof of
invention, not continual copyright protection).
127. Most Chinese citizens still speak only their native tongue, while most of those who
can speak English are concentrated in the major trading cities.
128. See Freiss, supra note 68.
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exacting standards are supervised at each step to ensure that the
host city satisfies enforcement requirements. As required by the
Olympic Charter, the IOC must approve all uses of the Olympic
marks and the BOCOG emblems, including both commercial and
noncommercial uses. This keeps all Olympic intellectual property
uses within the IOC's close rein. As required by the Olympic
Charter, the Host City Contract grants the IOC's licensees
exclusive, but limited, use of the Olympic marks within the
licensee's industry. The IOC's licensing contracts are linked to
Beijing's Olympic funding and subsidy levels.129  Thus, if
unauthorized use infringes on a company holding an Olympic
license, Beijing would feel the pinch. 3°
The BOCOG has set up a legal affairs department, "the first
ever in the history of Chinese sports,"'.. to provide legal expertise
for the industry, commerce, and customs authorities.' 2 Under the
guidance of the BOCOG's legal affairs committee, various
administrative departments will jointly combat Olympic
intellectual property infringement, including city check-ups by the
joint efforts of the SIPO, the Industrial and Commercial
Administration Bureau, the Copyright Bureau, and the Public
Security Bureau.'33 For example, the legal affairs department
advised SIPO to launch a mass propaganda campaign aimed at the
public.'3 Bulletins and posters educating the public on intellectual
property rights are displayed in the streets.
135
Infringement under IOC's broad and exclusive rights includes
potatoes laid out in the Olympic five-ring formation at a produce
stand, because such a display is used to generate business.'
36
Businesses that congratulate Beijing on the successful Olympics
129. Cf. Beijing Guards Olympic Logo, Nov. 1, 2001, at China Internet Info. Ctr.,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2001/Nov/21434.htm.
130. See Beijing Moves to Assure Rights of IOC Patrons, China Internet Info. Ctr., at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Jan/25220.htm (Jan. 14, 2002).
131. Id.
132. China Works to Protect Official Emblem, supra note 114.
133. The Beijing Municipal Bureau of Intellectual Property has been designated to
plan and coordinate the protection campaign. Associated Press, Beijing Launches Decree
to Fight Ambush Marketing, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Nov. 1, 2001, at
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200111/01/eng20011101_83679.html. See also Beijing
Moves to Assure Rights of IOC Patrons, supra note 130.
134. China Pledges Increased Protection for Intellectual Property, BEIJING TIMES, Apr.
27, 2002, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200204/27/eng20020427_94854.shtml
135. Id.
136. See Freiss, supra note 68.
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bid also constitute infringement. The legal affairs department
also has a hand in municipal regulations targeting Olympics patent
protection that effectively patched holes in current patent
rulings. 8
Thus far, actual enforcement of Olympic IPR has been given
high marks. The BOCOG conducts random "check-ups," displays
educational posters in the streets,'39 and has set up an infringement
reporting site. Through this website, the BOCOG joined a
national grassroots effort in curbing Olympic mark infringement.
Anyone logging on to the World Wide Web can access the Beijing
Olympics website and fill out an online form to report the
infringement electronically. 4' The SIPO remains the primary
enforcement institution, making a patriotic appeal in expounding
its mandate to its citizens not to infringe on Olympic marks and to
prove themselves to the world. The IOC emphasized the need for
Beijing to get the message out to "ordinary Chinese people who
care about China's first Olympics.' ' 42 Chinese citizens, raised on
socialist principles, can embrace the Olympic movement goal of
bringing athletic opportunities to all. This affinity for the Olympic
movement, free from politics, sheds new light on what intellectual
property can bring to a society. Chinese citizens were mobilized to
understand what benefits can come from intellectual property
protection.
V. STRENGTHENING DOMESTIC INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INDUSTRY
A growing domestic IP industry is significant, not only from a
general legal reform perspective, but also from the perspective of
137. See Legal Statement, supra note 123; see also Beijing Guards Olympic Logo, supra
note 129 ("declaring support or congratulations to Beijing in the media" also constitutes
"unauthorized usages" of the Olympic marks). Under the Olympic Charter and the IOC's
host city requirements, competitors of IOC's patrons-the official sponsors-cannot have
any connection to Olympic-related intellectual property. Id.
138. Wang Yefei, vice-director of the Beijing Intellectual Property Office, expressed
that new Olympic related regulations have "made up for.. .uncovered fields" in patent
rights on public welfare ads and performances. See More Efforts Taken to Keep Promise,
CHINA DAILY, Jan. 14, 2002, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-01/14/
content_101812.htm.
139. See Nationwide Checks Set on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 94.
140. Infringement Reporting, Official Website of BOCOG, at http://en.beijing-
2008.org/93/39/article211613993.shtml (n.d.).
141. Id.
142. Nationwide Checks Set on Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 94.
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intellectual property rights. Strengthening the domestic IP industry
is necessary for any changes brought about by Olympic fervor to
become permanent.
Beginning with the trend of privatizing state-owned
143enterprises, the ground became fertile for the growth of a
domestic IP industry. The first university program in intellectual
property education, implemented at Beijing University in 1993,' 14 nierit in 1944
spread to China's other major universities. Intellectual property
consumer associations and educational programs have formed.
Cities have begun their own programs to encourage innovation.
These initiatives, however, remain in their infancy. SIPO
reported that of the eleven major universities, less than five
146percent of students choose to take intellectual property courses.
Furthermore, specialized intellectual property courts suffer from a
lack of expertise and court competence. Competent authorities
and legal experts on intellectual property law are not formally
included in court proceedings, and thus are unable to render
assistance.' Despite the visibility of these changes, foreign
investors attempting to utilize these channels for redress have not
had much success.
A. Olympics and Legal Reform Toward the Rule of Law: Success
in Addressing Infringment
The Olympics infringement cases settle the controversy over
China's capability to control infringement. China has been
successful in utilizing the dual channels of the judiciary and the
143. An "open-door" policy began in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping, former Secretary
General of the Communist Party of the People's Republic of China, ending China's
isolation. See The Titan Stirs, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28, 1992, available at 1992 WL 11282205.
144. Xie Liangjun, New School Starts on Rights Track, CHINA DAILY, Dec. 16, 1993,
available at 1993 WL 10866676.
145. E.g., Rouse & Co. Int'l, Shanghai Awarded 54 Patents, CHINA PATENT EXPRESS,
No. 42, Nov. 14, 2003, at http://www.iprights.com/publications/chinapatentexpress/
cpex_42.asp#1 (Shanghai City Invention Patent Awards and Wuhan-China Optical Valley
Intellection Property Protection Forum); Rouse & Co. Int'l, China Ministry of Information
Industry Experts Warn: Digital Cameras May Encounter the Same Restrictions As DVD
Technology, CHINA PATENT EXPRESS, No. 42, Nov. 14, 2003, at http://www.iprights.com/
publications/chinapatentexpress/cpex-42.asp#1.
146. Chinese Government to Help Companies Deal with Intellectual Property Disputes,
BBC MONITORING ASIA PAC., Jan. 26, 2004, available at 2004 WL 64203313.
147. See Gregory S. Kolton, Comment, Copyright Law and the People's Courts in the
People's Republic of China: A Review and Critique of China's Intellectual Property Courts,
17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 415, 441 (1996).
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administrative agencies to enforce judgments in a manner atypical
of past trends. Instead of un-enforced judicial rulings and
interruptions by Party officials, enforcement of the Olympic marks
provides foreign investors with a safety net in this unfamiliar
terrain. The grand scale of the Olympics' success and the
transparency required by the IOC should alleviate investors' fears.
The Olympics is a stepping stone towards addressing more
complex intellectual property enforcement problems.
Administrative discretion and evidentiary problems that plague
other intellectual property enforcement are not present here.
There is one unambiguous standard to which the government has
promised to abide. Guided by the IOC and a legal affairs
department, the Chinese government is not in control in the way
that it is in control of other Party discretionary matters.
Domestic IPR holders are increasingly aware of the need to
have a consistent rule of law applied in intellectual property cases.
Despite China's traditional unwillingness under Confucian
principles to engage in adversarial dispute resolution, the
Olympics movement necessitates that this avenue be explored in
the honorable name of sports. A desensitization effect from
Olympics litigation, in addition to increased court usage initiated
by foreign parties and the increasing voice for legal reform, will
steer the preference for informal mediation towards more
predictable judicial rulings.
Furthermore, China's global export industry subjects its
domestic businesses to potential infringement suits abroad absent
reliable channels for dealing with infringement in China. For
example, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation
recently filed suit in California against Shanghai-based
Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation.148 The
decision to take a Chinese defendant company to court in
California demonstrates existing dissatisfaction with China's
intellectual property enforcement mechanisms.
B. Progress for Foreign Trademark Owners
Foreign companies that have taken the leap into the China
market and risked intellectual property piracy from the beginning
148. See Jason Dean, Taiwan Semiconductor Sues Chinese Rival over Patents, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2003, at A3.
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remain cautious in the face of the government's promises. 49 But
foreign trademark owners are already seeing progress in multiple
contexts outside the Olympics. One major change is in customs
controls. For example, the Olympics-motivated tightened customs
controls resulted in seized counterfeit Lancome perfume in
November 2003.150 China's border control of exports tainted with
unauthorized Olympics symbols has been successful, not only in
terms of confiscations, but also in terms of pushing China to
balance foreign protection with domestic interests.' Unlike
Sydney, where most counterfeit Olympic goods were found in
import transit, China has to deal with customs seizures of goods
made in China for export. For the first time, an export control
framework for seizing infringing goods has been implemented.
China has taken center stage since its accession to the WTO,
becoming the United States' fourth largest trading partner and
second largest source of imports."' U.S. pressure on China is also
increasing to fulfill WTO promises and increase transparency.'53
The drastically decreased tariffs made many countries, especially
the United States, feel insecure in the newly competitive labor and
149. Walt Disney President Robert Iger expressed the opinion that China made
commitments but haven't delivered results. Piracy in China Vexes US Media Industry,
XINHUA FIN. NETWORK, Jan. 12, 2004, available at 2004 WL 56741668.
150. Xiamen Customs seized counterfeit Lancome perfume for the first time. Rouse &
Co. Int'l, First Customs Seizure of Counterfeit LANCOME Perfume in China, CHINA IP
EXPRESS, No. 189, Nov. 24, 2003, at http://www.iprights.com/publications/
chinaipexpress/ciexi 89.asp. In September 2003, U.S.-based Educational Testing Service
(ETS) and the Graduate Management Admission Council (GMAC) received a $1.2
million copyright and trademark infringement judgment against unauthorized use of these
company's exams. See Rouse & Co Int'l, New Oriental Ruled Infringement in Copyright
and Trademark Lawsuit, CHINA IP EXPRESS, No. 183, Sept. 23, 2003, at
http://www.iprights.com/publications/chinaipexpress/ciex-183.asp. One area that remains a
problem for foreign investors is the music industry, but with the advent of the internet,
music piracy is a global problem rampant even in the United States. See, e.g., Case,
Copyright Law - Ninth Circuit Holds that Computer File-Sharing Software Vendors are Not
Liable for Users' Copyright Infringement, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1761 (2005) (outlining the
current legal obstacles to overcoming music piracy in the United States).
151. See Olympic Symbols Receive Protection, supra note 62.
152. U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Int'l Info. Programs, China Not a Market Economy
Yet, Commerce Official Says (Oct. 1, 2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/
display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2003&m=October&x=20031001170108esromO.1587 9 46&t
=xarchives/xarchitem.html [hereinafter Aldonas' Statement] (transcript of Grant Aldonas'
statement to House Panel).
153. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Int'l Info. Programs, Grassley Urges
China to Comply with Its Trade Obligations (Oct. 7, 2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov
(transcript of press release from Senate Finance Committee).
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business environment."' The current rhetoric of the Bush
administration is one of criticism, wielding the WTO over China,
and reminiscent of pre-accession negotiations that fostered China's
distrust of Western countries. 55 Advocating for U.S. domestic
industries threatened by the post-accession export of U.S. labor,
U.S. representatives called upon China to "play by the rules" of1156
the WTO. Now that trade has been increasingly opened to
Chinese markets, the problem has shifted from China's previous
unwillingness to trade at all to the current problem of counterfeit
U.S. goods, costin~ U.S. companies twenty to twenty-five billion
dollars each year. The United States' repeated declarations that
it will not seek WTO sanctions for "noncompliance" suggests that
China is noncompliant, angering Party leaders. Instead of
threatening unilateral trade sanctions directly, the United States
now makes similar threats through the WTO1
Instead of lobbying the U.S. government, foreign investors
should divert their resources into providing legal expertise to
Chinese governmental and non-governmental intellectual property
associations, which can then place internal pressure on the Chinese
government for competence in the courts. With increasing
acceptance of legal reform and an increasing awareness of a need
for intellectual property education, the aid will not be ill-received
if the proper channels are used.
VI. CONCLUSION
Hosting the Olympic Games in a nation historically lacking in
private property rights brings to the forefront the problem of
intellectual property adherence. In China's past, foreign pressure
154. UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
CHINA'S WTO COMPLIANCE 8 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
CHINA'S WTO COMPLIANCE]; see, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 1.
155. The United States attributes China's intellectual property enforcement deficiency
to corruption, protectionism, and lack of coordination and training, and organized crime.
See 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA'S WTO COMPLIANCE, supra note 154 at 38;
U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Int'l Info. Programs, China Not Fulfilling All WTO
Commitments, USTR Says (Sept. 24, 2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov (transcript of
statement by Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Charles W. Freeman III to the
Congressional - Executive Commission on China).
156. See Levine's Testimony, supra note 99.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. See Aldonas' Statement, supra note 152.
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to change China into a "rule of law" state overnight, while
expecting enforcement of intellectual property rights through such
a channel, had only served to generate more mistrust. China's
transition must be respected, while working with the effective
channels within the state to further intellectual property protection
through education and legal reform.
The prospect of hosting the 2008 Olympics has changed
intellectual property's rank on China's priority list, at least with
respect to the IOC's protected marks. The unprecedented national
scale of the 2008 Olympic effort will have the added effect of
increasing social understanding of the intellectual property rights
concept. In turn, this facilitates a spillover effect in the state's
efforts to increase intellectual property rights enforcement in other
areas. Unlike past inconsistencies of administrative discretion in
IPR enforcement, Olympic IPR enforcement has a wholly
different dynamic, signaling that this could become a permanent
trend.
Ironically, now that China's borders are open to trade at an
unprecedented level, the United States has resurrected a
protectionist tone toward its relationship with China.' 6° The main
criticism is the rampant counterfeit products flowing from the
subsidized manufacturing industry.161 The United States, however,
must not fall back into its threatening rhetoric and must practice
what it preaches. Let this be a reminder that, in the world
economy, competition is not a zero-sum game, but everyone loses
162in protectionism.
The move towards "rule of law" not only fosters an infant
domestic intellectual property regime, but also constructs the
foundation upon which foreign intellectual property will be
protected. The transformation from "rule by law" to "rule of law"
will cement China's revolution into a market economy. Within this
market economy, intellectual property rights become valuable,
spurring innovation, and increasing profits for both domestic and
160. Congress has discussed the possible repeal of China's Normal Trade Relations
status and the imposition of tariffs on Chinese imports. See U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of
Int'l Info. Programs, Bush Opposes Repeal of NTR with China, Evans Says (Nov. 10,
2003), at http://usinfo.state.gov.
161. Peggy Hu, Commerce Secretary's Remarks in Minnesota Nov. 6, available at
Bureau of Int'l Info. Programs, U.S. Dep't of State, http://usinfo.state.gov (Nov. 10, 2003).
162. Rich Karlgaard, China Syndrome; Digital Rules, FORBES, Oct. 27, 2003, at 45.
("The urge to blame China must be avoided.").
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foreign right-holders. Finally, these changes are harbingers of the
future investment climate in China, a post-Olympics intellectual
property infrastructure that will become increasingly conducive to
proprietary technology and brand investment.
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